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DROIT DU TRAVAIL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOUR ARBITRATION IN ONTARIO Mark Thompson
Courts in Ontario hâve been increasingly willing to quash grievance arbitration awards. This article analyses the services of this conflict between the judiciary and arbitrators, the rôle the courts hâve assumed because of the compulsory use of arbitration, and the judges' reliance on précèdent established British commercial arbitration. Most Ontario cases hâve involved one of four issues -évidence of intent, procédural violations of grievance clauses, disciplinary penalties, and déniai of natural justice. In the first three areas especially, the courts hâve favoured narrow interprétations of collective agreements, limiting arbitrators* jurisdiction. This problem illustrâtes the difficulty in attempting to legislate a complex institution like grievance arbitration based on foreign expérience, Le. the United States.
For almost thirty years, grievance arbitration has been an increasingly important feature of industrial relations in Ontario. Recently, however, the légal status of arbitration awards has become less certain than ever before. In a number of cases, Ontario courts (with support from the Suprême Court of Canada) hâve overturned arbitrators' décisions, established broader grounds for challenging them, and thus encouraged new suits to quash awards. After one Suprême Court of Canada décision in late 1968, a group of prominent arbitrators protested to the Provincial Minister of Labour that the judiciary's action had made arbitration more rigid than court proceedings, and vainly sought this support for changes in the law to eliminate some courtimposed restrictions on arbitration l . labour, management, and arbitrators themselves to re-examine the légal bases of grievance arbitration. In such an analysis, it is necessary to ask first, which éléments of Ontario labour relations law hâve led the courts to overturn awards. Secondly, if the courts retain their présent position on arbitration, and the provincial government opposes statutory amendment, an examination of areas of conflict between arbitrators and the courts may indicate coming trends in judicial action. This paper will trace the development of judicial review of grievance arbitration in Ontario in an effort to deal with each of thèse questions. It will then discuss briefly the possible relationship between the interprétation of Ontario labour law and broader aspects of Canadian industrial relations.
Both the apparent involvement of the courts in arbitration and

CONTEXT OF ARBITRATION
Grievance arbitration was first used extensively in Ontario after the enactment of spécial législation during World War II. In 1939, many enterprises in the province were not unionized or had been organized only a short time. A few industries, including garment manufacturing, railroads, and coal mining, had their own arbitration Systems, but available évidence indicates thèse were exceptional cases 2 . Provincial labour laws, though comprehensive, had little effect on the parties prior to the implementation of emergency fédéral législation during the war. The most important fédéral act, Privy Council Order (PC) 1003, governed ail labour-management relations in the latter years of the war. Incorporating many features of the United States National Labor Relations Act, it also compelled resort to private arbitration as the last step of ail grievance procédures and banned any work stoppages during the life of an agreement between labour and management. When the parties were unable to agrée on their own procédures, the fédéral government provided facilities for grievance arbitration 3 . One effect of PC 1003 and other wartime législation was the introduction of grievance arbitration into many enterprises in Ontario.
With the end of the war and the expiration of fédéral powers, the provincial government continued to favour arbitration. The Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA) 4 , passed in 1948, retained many provisions of PC 1003, including sections to compel grievance arbitration and forbidding strikes during the life of an agreement. This provision has not been changed substantially, and it now imposes the following terms : Should the parties fail to include a clause meeting the requirements of this section in a collective agreement, the law stipulâtes a clause which will apply, providing for a tripartite arbitration board. In ail cases, if the parties' nominees to a board are unable to agrée upon a third member, the Minister of Labour is empowered to name the chairman 6 .
Support for the arbitral process and a concomitant désire to exclude the courts from arbitration are reflected in several provisions of the OLRA. Section 34(7), just cited, apparently gives arbitrators full authority to décide questions of arbitrability, thus eliminating a potential source of litigation. Elsewhere the law makes ail awards binding on the parties and gives board chairmen broad powers to gather évidence and administer oaths 7 . The OLRA specifically excludes labour disputes from législation governing commercial arbitration 8 , which establishes grounds for judicial appeals of awards. Another statute protects unions and collective agreements from ail civil suits except those provided for by the OLRA 9 .
In many respects, grievance arbitration appears to be a créature of the law. Although labour and management might well hâve adopted the institution without any compulsion, the initial stimulus of PC 1003, and the requirement of the OLRA appears to hâve caused the courts to examine arbitration closely, despite législative efforts to limit the rôle of the judiciary 10 .
GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Although the OLRA déclares arbitration awards to be « final and binding », this provision has not precluded review by the courts. A successful challenge to an award occurs when the High Court of Justice (a trial court) grants certiorari and quashes it. In gênerai, the plaintiff may claim one of three grounds as the basis for certiorari : a defect in the jurisdiction of the tribunal, an error in law on the face of the award, or a lack of natural justice in the proceedings n . Traditionally, the courts hâve held that an arbitrator's error does not always nullify an award. But if an arbitrator exceeds his jurisdiction by deciding a question not put to him by the parties, or orders a remedy not in his power to grant, he has gone beyond the authority given him, and his award is invalid. Thus most successful suits to quash arbitration awards in Ontario hâve alleged that an arbitration board has exceeded its jurisdiction 12 . Lack of natural justice may invalidate any proceeding, but is relatively rare in labour arbitration cases 13 .
In 1956 the Ontario courts first asserted their right to review arbitration awards, in Re International Nickel Company and Rivando 14 , a décision that also introduced the éléments of the law that were to lead to the growth in the judiciary's rôle in arbitration. The case arose from the dismissal of a worker for unauthorized absence after management had refused him unpaid leave to serve a jail sentence. Seeking to quash an arbitration award that ordered reinstatement, the company took its case to Ontario's highest tribunal, the Court of Appeal. The court ruled that it had jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, relying on the légal requirement of the parties to use arbitration and the power of the courts to supervise « statutory tribunals ».
The Rivando décision emphasized that the OLRA imposed on labour and management the légal obligation to bargain and to « make every reasonable effort to make a collective agreement »
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. As disputes arising from the interprétation of a contract are subject to final settlement only by arbitration, the court concluded that the parties had no alternative to arbitration of grievances, i.e. neither true collective bargaining with the right to strike, nor litigation. Because of this compulsion, the court ruled that it was obligated to supervise arbitration boards When asserting its authority, the Court relied on cases drawn from British arbitration, and particularly the law governing « statutory tribunals », bodies other than courts to whom Parliament has given the power of imposing obligations. Thèse tribunals generally are administrative boards established to décide disputes between private citizens and public agencies over such matters as the value of property expropriated by the government, and the Court drew an analogy with the compulsory use of private arbitration in the OLRA. According to the Court of Appeal, strong précèdent exists in British law for judicial supervision of statutory tribunals, thus adding a second rationale for reviewing arbitration awards n .
Hère it should be emphasized that the Court's déclaration of its authority to supervise arbitration did not necessarily mean that it would intervene extensively in the process. For instance, the Court could hâve exercised its authority by supporting the judgment of arbitrators, on the grounds that the parties in a dispute who had chosen a particular arbitration board should be required to accept its décision. In fact, the Ontario judiciary did not adopt such a policy of limited supervision, due in large measure to the précédents used in Rivando and subséquent cases. Use of British commercial law proved to be a major factor in the eventual expansion in the scope of judicial review.
Références to British cases in Rivando were not, of course, unusual in Canadian jurisprudence, but the nature of thèse précédents was to be important in the subséquent expansion of judicial review of arbitration. Lacking a substantial body of Canadian case law on labour arbitration, the Court looked to British précèdent. Since grievance arbitration scarcely exists in Great Britain
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, however, the British décisions governed commercial arbitration, regulated by a spécial statute 19 comparable to the Ontario Arbitrallons Act, from which the OLRA excludes labour arbitration. The présent British law, based on common law principles, is a consolidation of earlier enactments, principally between 1889 and 1934, which gave rise to the cases used to interpret the OLRA. Clearly, the Court of Appeal saw problems in using British law in Canada and applying n Although the Court's logic on this point is évident, British opinion appears less certain on the rôle of the courts in statutory arbitration. The most authoritative commentary on British arbitration states :
It is of the essence of statutory arbitration of the normal sort, that the statute concerned makes a particular arbitral tribunal the only tribunal having jurisdiction over a particular class of dispute. It follows in particular, that the provision of the [Arbitration] Act which gives the court power to refuse a stay of concurrent légal proceedings, and in certain sorts of arbitration also those giving power to allow revocation of the arbitrator's authority and power to remove an arbitrator, will in gênerai be found inapplicable to statutory arbitration. The feature of British arbitration that became most significant for Ontario cases is the extensive influence of the law in private proceedings. In gênerai, British commercial arbitrators emulate judicial décisions as much as possible 20 . The same rules of évidence bind private arbitrators and the courts, unless the parties to arbitration hâve agreed otherwise, and errors in the admission of évidence significant to a décision are cause for upsetting an award 21 . Both the common law and subséquent statutes regulate an arbitrator's obligations and establish the grounds for overturning arbitration awards 22 . Moreover, under the Arbitration Act, either party in an arbitration, at any stage of the proceedings prior to the award, may compel the arbitrator to submit a question of law arising in the case to the courts for an opinion (a « stated » or «spécial» case). Or the arbitrator may request such a ruling on his own initiative. On the other hand, the court has the power, without any application from either party, to remit an award for reconsideration by the arbitrator 23 . Judicial and arbitral proceedings may also take place in a single case, the courts deciding points of law, and arbitrators the factual éléments of the dispute 24 .
The practice of commercial arbitration also encourages reliance on the law. Most cases arise from relatively short-lived commercial relationships and contracts covering a limited range of subjects. There is little évidence of the protracted bargaining, with offers and concessions on many topics, or a « common law » of arbitration awards that mark semipermanent labour-management relationships. Thus the bases for décisions of commercial arbitrators are more restricted than in North American grievance cases. As a conséquence of the law and thèse traditions, British commercial arbitration appears more as a branch of the law than a process of private decision-making.
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
After Rivando established the courts' right to overrule arbitration boards, the judiciary hesitated to exercise this power, beginning with the refusai by the Court of Appeal to quash the award in Rivando. In several subséquent cases, the Court examined the agreement under which a challenged award was made, and when it thought the contract language could « reasonably bear » the interprétation of the arbitration board, the award was sustained, even if the Court might hâve made a différent reading of the contract 25 . Having established this principle, however, the appellate court heard few cases. Instead the High Court of Justice formulated a set of rules to govern certiorari, and thèse rules limited its own powers.
In granting certiorari, the lower court followed the Court of Appeal in turning to British arbitration law for standards to use in classifying cases. Awards were divided into two catégories : one in which an arbitrator ruled on a « spécifie question of law», and a second in which a « question of law became material » to an award. The Ontario Court of Appeal and the Suprême Court of Canada first accepted this distinction in a case arising from a dispute between a contractor and a mining company over the construction of a road, a rather typical example of a Canadian commercial arbitration case 26 . In turn, the Canadian courts based their décision on a prominent House of Lords case of a similar nature, Absalom v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society 27 .
As it was initially applied in Ontario, the Absalom rule severely restricted the power of the Courts to quash arbitration awards. The common law in both Great Britain and Canada did not permit the quashing of an arbitrator's décision on a « spécifie question of law », assuming absence of fraud or misconduct. Even when the courts disagreed with an award, they avoided intervention, on the grounds that the parties had foregone the right to appeal by their use of arbitration. In practice, the rule excluded a large percentage of arbitration awards from judicial review in the early years of its application 28 .
However, the Ontario courts never defined precisely a « spécifie question of law », although it apparently was an interprétation of a contract clause where the parties agreed on the facts of a case. In Absalom the arbitrator determined what payments were due a contractor, a spécifie question of law in the eyes of the court. A similar conclusion A « question of law became material » when an arbitrator's award depended on déterminations of both law and fact, and the common law permits courts to quash such décisions. Again there was difficulty in defining this category of cases. One authority on arbitration explained that a question of law became material when a board had to interpret an agreement before dealing with the facts presented. If the contract interprétation should be incorrect, an error of law would serve as the basis for a décision and thereby establish grounds for quashing an award 30 . Yet the courts hâve often ruled that questions of law are material in disciplinary cases, where arbitrators gêner ally décide the veracity of charges against a worker and then apply a contract clause to the facts of the case.
This distinction was difficult to explain, and it proved to be artificial in its application to labour cases 31 . As Canadian labour arbitrators followed usual North American custom and often examined a variety of factors in arriving at their décisions, e.g. past practices, precontract negotiations, etc., matters of law and fact were inextricably mixed. When the courts tried to apply the Absalom rule, they began to find « material questions of law » more frequently, an almost inévitable conséquence of the différ-ences in the two arbitration Systems. By the mid-1960's, the proportion of successuful challenges to awards appears to hâve risen sharply. The issues before the courts varied, and will be discussed in the second half of this paper, but the gênerai resuit of the décisions was a substantial érosion of the restriction on judicial action implicit in the courts' original assertion of their authority to review arbitration.
As this trend grew more pronounced, another attack on the validity of the Absalom rule was made. The broad assertion of judicial authority in Rivando raised a question of the courts' right to reject pétitions for certiorari on the gênerai grounds that they answered spécifie questions of law. It was this problem of judicial responsibility that caused the Court of Appeal in 1968 to dismiss the distinction developed by the lower court.
Extending the logic of Rivando, the Court in Regina v. Barber explicitly rejected the division of arbitration cases based on Absalom
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. The décision involved a part-time super-market clerk who claimed certain benefits provided in a collective agreement. An arbitration board denied the benefits, and when the union appealed the décision to the courts, the employer argued that the award was not subject to review because the Although élimination of the Absalom rule opened the door to more extensive judicial review of the arbitral process, Mr. Justice Jessup, writing for the Court in Barber, did not outline clearly the dimensions of the doorway the Court saw before it. At one point, he said that an award will not be overruled for an error in law « simply because the Court considers some other interprétation more apt if the interprétation of the language is one it will reasonably bear » 35 , an apparent return to the earlier practice of the Court in upholding awards 36 . Elsewhere, he cited with approval a British common law rule that bars review of awards in which the arbitrator decided the « very question » that the parties presented, but calling for certiorari where the arbitrator has relied on inadmissible évidence or misconstrued a contract 37 .
It appears that Justice Jessup may hâve proposed a newer version of the Absalom rule 38 , one according the courts broad authority to review awards, but giving them the power to nullify only those awards in which the arbitrators hâve not answered the « very question given them, or in which the contract will not « reasonably bear » the interprétation of an award. Clearly, the full impact of this décision will only become known as the courts apply thèse principles in future cases. In Barber, the Court quashed the award on the grounds that the contract would not reasonably bear the interprétation of the arbitration board.
The Barber décision is linked to another change in Ontario labour arbitration, the replacement of county court judges as chairmen of arbitration boards. In 1967 Parliament acted to restrict the non-judicial activities of county court judges, who had traditionally served as neutral members of arbitration boards in Ontario 39 . This amendment, designed to encourage the professionalization of labour arbitration, has apparently exacerbated the clash between North American practice and British law described above. Non-judicial board chairmen (who generally write awards), though frequently lawyers, seem to décide cases with greater attention to the principles of industrial relations than do judges, who look more closely to the law and the wording of the agreement. Thus the views of the arbitration process held by the courts and arbitrators are likely to diverge more widely in the future. In light of the attitude of the courts, and the changes taking place within the arbitration profession, it is probable that new challenges to arbitration awards will be made in the courts. Moreover, after Barber, the courts hâve faced the necessity of formulating new policies towards arbitration. An examination of the existing body of case law suggests directions the courts may take. Thèse décisions, generally less than four years old, resulted from cases, mentioned above, involving material questions of law decided before Barber. However, the principles they contain could easily be applied within the limits of Barber. They are concentrated in four areas of labour arbitration where arbitrators and the courts hâve failed most frequently to agrée on the démarcation of their respective jurisdictions, and they iflustrate the difficulty of applying the law of commercial arbitration to labour cases.
EVIDENCE OF INTENT
Perhaps the most difficult question has been the admissibility of évidence. Though the OLRA frees arbitration boards from the common law rules of évidence 40 , the courts hâve restricted admission to arbitration of évidence of the parties' intent underlying contract clauses.
As the Absalom rule was applied in Canada, an arbitration board ruling on a spécifie question of law could go beyond a mère reading of the contract language only if the wording were ambiguous, while there were few restrictions on évidence in cases involving material questions of law. Though such a principle is almost inhérent in arbitration, labour arbitration often occurs when the negotiators of a contract are unable to agrée on a single interprétation of a provision, so arbitrators may look to évidence of intent, implicitly ruling that a contract is ambiguous. But the courts hâve readily ruled that agreements subject to arbitration were in fact unambiguous, quashing awards on the grounds that the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction by admitting « extrinsic > évidence, Le., évidence of the parties' intent beyond the written agreement.
In one early case 41 , the parties engaged three arbitrators who had served as a conciliation board in récent contract bargaining. The arbitrators based their décision on a reading of the agreement and a mémorandum exchanged by the parties prior to negotiations. Despite the obvious advantage of the arbitration board in determining the intent of the parties in bargaining, or the lack of genuine agreement on the meaning of a contract clause, the Court of Appeal quashed the award on the grounds the wording was so unambiguous that it precluded the use of any évidence beyond the wording of the contracta This décision was somewhat exceptional, however, as the courts were generally disposed to accept arbitrators' judgement as to the need for using extrinsic évidence 43 .
This issue was faced squarely by the Court of Appeal in Barber, when it ruled that the agreement was so unambiguous that use of évidence of the parties' past practices was an error in law. In his décision, Justice Jessup emphasized that the intent of the parties should be « derived from their plain words rather than from extrinsic évidence » u . This aspect of Barber appears to hâve made the lower court increasingly reluctant to allow extrinsic évidence in arbitration. In a séries of cases decided in 1968-1969, the courts haved quashed awards based on the conduct of the parties prior to negotiating a contract 45 , conversations between management and labour 46 , management's past practice 47 , and the history of bargaining between the parties 48 , always because the contract wording was so unambiguous that the arbitrators' use of such évidence exceeded their jurisdiction. In De Laval, the court disallowed the arbitrators' findkig of ambiguity based on a reading of two contract clauses together, noting that each clause, if taken separately, was unambiguous.
Even this brief analysis reveals the courts' disposition to rely heavily on contract language, at the expense of other évidence, in the interprétation of agreements. The readiness of the judiciary to déclare contract language unambiguous is also striking, as practioners often admit that such agreements are worded imprecisely 49 .
PROCÉDURAL VIOLATIONS
A second area of dispute between the courts and arbitrators is that of procédural irregularities in the filing og grievances. The issue first arose in late 1965, when a union sought certiorari to quash an arbitrator's décision not to hear a grievance on its merits because of an « unreasonable delay » (five months) in initiating arbitration 50 . As no spécifie time limit appeared in the contract, the board presumably had broad authority to rule on the question of timeliness, but the Court of Appeal quashed the award on the grounds that the arbitrators had failed to exercise their jurisdiction by refusing to hear explanations for the delay. Although the Court did acknowledge that the grievant's delay could hâve been sufficient reason to refuse him access to arbitration, it denied that the board's décision constituted such a ruling.
Initially, this décision indicated a willingness of the courts to support the évaluation of circumstances underlying technical violations of grievance procédures. This view received further support when the High Court of Justice denied certiorari against an arbitration award which rejected a claim of procédural irregularity the employer raised for the first time in the arbitration hearing 51 . The court accepted the principles behind the claim, but agreed that managements delay had vitiated the challenge.
Early in 1968 both the Court of Appeal and the Suprême Court of Canada took stricter views of procédural violations. In Regina v. Weiler 52 , the Court of Appeal upheld an award which decided a grievance on its merits and disregarded a delay in the notice of arbitration. But the Suprême Court rêversed the décision on appeal 53 , on the grounds the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction by not enforcing strict adhérence to the grievance procédure.
While the Weiler case was pending before the Suprême Court, the Ontario judiciary adopted a less flexible position on procédural violations 54 . In a décision ultimately upheld by the Suprême Court 55 , the Court of Appeal overruled an arbitration board that had decided to ignore a delay in the request for a hearing and had ruled on the merits of a grievance. The delay was caused by the union appointée to the board, who was uncertain if the grievance would be taken to arbitration and waited five weeks beyond the contractual time limit before asking the Minister of Labour to nominate a neutral member. When constituted, the arbitration board expressed doubts about the force of the time limits in the agreement, as well as observing that neither the grievant nor his agent had caused the delay, before ruling on the original grievance. The courts quashed the award because of the delay, denying the arbitrators' assertion that the flaw was a « technical irregularity », and describing the union's nominee on the board as the grievant's agent
The décision in Hoar represented a significant shift in the courts' attitude from the Ottawa Newspaper Guild décision. In the latter case, they seemed to encourage or even order arbitrators to examine the circumstances surrounding procédural violations, while the Hoar ruling indicated that arbitrators wÛl hâve limited authority to go beyond a narrow interprétation on the clauses governing grievance procédures 56 .
DISCIPLINARY PENALTIES
Contract clauses specifying discharge for « just cause >, almost universal features in North American collective agreements, hâve been a fréquent source of disagreement between the courts and arbitrators. In disciplinary cases, North American arbitrators often conclude that the penalty of discharge is too severe for the offense committed, though a grievant may hâve violated the agreement or rules established under it. In thèse circumstances, arbitrators frequently order a reduced penalty for the grievant 57 , but the Ontario courts hâve refused to sustain such awards in the absence of explicit contractual authorization.
A séries of High Court décisions in the past décade, never challenged in the Court of Appeal, established this principle. In Regina v. Bigelow 58 , the earliest case, an arbitration board heard the appeal of an employée discharged for absenteeism and failure to report for work in a fit condition. A majority found that the grievant had not been punished at ail for such offenses in several years, so the discharge, though justified, was unreasonable, and the employée was reinstated without back pay, équivalent to a seven-month suspension. The court quashed the award on the grounds that the board had exceeded its jurisdiction by going beyond a ruling on the truth of management^ allégation of misconduct. Having found the employée guilty, the board had no power to alter his penalty. When the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal of the ruling, the question of the arbitrators' authority in this area appeared settled in Ontario.
This assumption was upset, at least in the minds of some arbitrators, by the Polymer 59 décision, one of the early arbitration cases heard by the Suprême Court of Canada. An appeal sought to quash an award that ordered a union to compensate the employer for losses caused by a wildcat strike. Despite the absence of any mention of damages in the contract and the Ontario ban on suits against unions, the Suprême Court upfaeld the right of arbitrators to fashion such a remedy. Many arbitrators, after reading Polymer, believed they had received power to assess other penalties, including remédies in disciplinary cases.
Arbitrators' expectations of greater authority were dispelled in 1966-1968 by the Ontario judiciary, with support from the Suprême Court. Initially, the High Court of Justice, relying on Bigelow, refused to permit any changes in disciplinary penalties 60 , and then renied that such an award constituted the fashioning of a remedy analgous to damages in Polymer 61 . However, when the Court of Appeal again heard the issue, in Regina v. Arthur s
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, there was an apparent shift in opinion favouring greater autonomy for arbitrators, perhaps the resuit of the influence of Mr. Justice Bora Laskin, a former arbitrator, recently appointed to the Court.
The grievants in Arthur s were three senior workers, one the local union président, whom the employer discharged for taking temporary jobs with another firm. Although their action violated the contract, the employées acted in anticipation of seasonal layoffs, which did not occur. When an arbitration board reduced the penalties to suspensions, management sought certiorari to quash the award.
Justice Laskin, speaking for a divided court, saw two éléments in the arbitrators* function. First they were obliged to détermine the truth of the employer's charges. If they found against the grievants, the board had to décide whether their conduct was « proper cause » for their discharge under the terms of the agreement. The board in Arthur s supported the employer on the first question, but ruled that the grievants' action did not warrant discharge and ordered reinstatement. Laskin noted that in Bigelow the arbitrators ruled there was just cause for discharge, but still substituted suspension, whereas in Arthur s no grounds for discharge were found.
Briefly stated, Laskin's décision would give arbitrators the power to interpret disciplinary clauses with considération to the equities involved and principles of industrial relations, a view of the arbitrator's rôle shared by most American authorities 63 , but less popular in Canada. A study of arbitration in Ontario made when most board chairmen were county court judges revealed that few arbitrators in the province would modify disciplinary penalties unless the contract explicitly granted them the authority 64 . It appears that some arbitrators in Ontario now favour a more libéral view of their power and thus came into conflict with the courts. After his opinion in Arthur s, Justice Laskin seemed to be in a position to persuade both the courts and arbitrators to give arbitration boards broader authority, at least in discharge cases.
This notion was dispelled by the Suprême Court of Canada décision over-ruling Laskin in Arthur s 65 . The Court held that the arbitration board had assumed managerial authority by ordering reinstatement and should hâve restricted its inquiry to the existence of proper cause for discharge. Since the facts clearly indicated a violation of the contract, the employer did hâve proper cause to dismiss the grievants. It was the Arthur s décision that prompted the appeal to the Labour Ministry mentioned earlier.
It is apparent that the courts will not sustain future awards changing disciplinary penalties unless an arbitration board is specifically given the necessary authority to do so in an agreement 66 .
DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE
Findings that natural justice has been denied in arbitration occasionally cause the courts to quash an award. Such cases, though rare, go to the heart of a labour-management relationship. Common law principles of natural justice refer to the rights of « parties » 67 , without defining who is a « party » to a contract, as this issue seldom arises outside of labourmanagement agreements. Individual employées, who obviously are affected by an agreement, are not signatories to it, and hence may be denied access to arbitration, for instance. This restriction may be defended on a strict légal basis, and also on the grounds that individual workers may not promote the affective administration of a contract by participating in arbitration on their own behalf. Neither argument seems to hâve received serious attention in the Ontario courts or the Suprême Court.
The judiciary has emphasized the rights of individual workers to be included in arbitration proceedings, especially where effective représenta-tion of their interests by a union is unlikely. A séries of décisions in 1967-1968 spelled out the standards of natural justice necessary for arbitration proceedings. When two groups of unionized employées were competing for a single set of benefits under a collective agreement, the Ontario courts ruled that ail workers concerned must be notified of the hearing 68 . The Suprême Court of Canada added criteria for the existence of natural justice in arbitration : that persons affected be informed of the nature of the case ; that thèse persons be allowed to présent their case to the arbitrators ; and that the board act in good faith ®. Later the Ontario courts quashed an award for déniai of natural justice because the chairman had gathered évidence in the absence of other board members 70 .
CONCLUSIONS
In answer to the questions raised at the outset of this paper, the factors in Ontario labour law giving rise to judicial intervention are clear -the compulsory use of grievance arbitration, and the use of British commercial law by the courts in shaping their policy towards labour arbitration. In récent years, the courts hâve overcome their initial reluctance to intervene and seem to be moving in the direction of doser scrutiny of arbitration awards. Almost equally obvious is the courts' préférence for a legalistic philosophy of arbitration, with décisions based only on strict textual analyses of collective agreements, even where contract provisions may be vague. In fact, except for their treatment of natural justice, the courts appear to be encouraging a System that resembles British commercial arbitration for grievance seulement in Ontario. Though many employers, unions, and arbitrators favour legalism in collective bargaining, the protest by leading arbitrators to the Labour Minister indicates that this position is scarcely unanimous in Ontario. Moreover, few, if any, of the arbitrators who addressed the Minister were county court judges, so it is the protesters who should become more important to labour arbitration as a resuit of changes in the Judges Act.
Fundamental causes of judicial intervention may go beyond the légal philosophies of Ontario jurists. In enacting the OLRA the Provincial Législature drew heavily on U.S. expérience, as previously transplanted to Canada by PC 1003. In addition to adopting sorne éléments of the National Labor Relations Act, Ontario legislated in favour of Americanstyle grievance arbitration, an institution virtually unknown in labour- If any further évidence were needed, the judicial review of labour arbitration again illustrâtes the difficultés in transferring industrial relations practices from one nation to another. Assuming no change in the law of arbitration is imminent, employers and unions wishing to avoid the effects of Ontario court décisions may be forced to re-word collective agreements to state explicitly the limits of arbitrators' authority. This would facilitate the development of arbitration without intervention by the courts and less influenced by the United States, as well as encouraging the professionalization of arbitration. Obviously, such action entail risks for both parties, but acceptance of thèse hazards may contribute to the création of a new and more effective System for grievance seulement.
LES APPELS DES DÉCISIONS ARBITRALES DEVANT LES TRIBUNAUX EN ONTARIO
Au cours des dernières années, les conflits entre les arbitres du travail et les tribunaux se sont accentués en Ontario. Il en est résulté un nombre croissant d'arrêtés judiciaires cassant les sentences arbitrales. Bien que ce phénomène soit relativement récent, les fondements juridiques sont beaucoup plus anciens. Dans cet article, nous en analysons les facteurs et nous étudions les décisions récentes afin de mettre en lumière les tendances de la pensée juridique en Ontario. L'arbitrage des griefs a été institué en Ontario pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, en particulier lorsque la législation fédérale extraordinaire était en vigueur. Après la guerre, la Loi sur les relations professionnelles (OLRA) a rendu le recours à l'arbitrage obligatoire pour régler les griefs restés sans solution. Ce fait a encouagé les tribunaux à contrôler les arbitrages de près, et a contribué, entre autres, à asseoir l'autorité des tribunaux de se prononcer sur les arbitrages.
Bien que la OLRA déclare les sentences arbitrales être des jugements définitifs, la loi reconnaît des moyens de recours pour renverser les sentences arbitrales par les tribunaux. Généralement, un tel renversement s'appuie sur le manque de juridiction de l'arbitre.
C'est en 1956 que les tribunaux d'Ontario ont, pour la première fois, affirmé leur pouvoir de réviser les sentences dans le cas de International Nickel Company and Rivando. La Cour d'appel a décidé qu'en raison de la nature obligatoire de l'arbitrage pour régler les griefs, elle n'avait d'autre solution que d'exercer une surveillance du processus. En déclarant être investie de pouvoir judiciaire, la Cour s'est basée sur des cas tirés de l'arbitrage commercial britannique. Cette institution est liée plus étroitement au droit que l'arbitrage des griefs ne l'est généralement en Amérique du Nord, et elle s'appuie sur l'interprétation littérale des termes du contrat.
Depuis le cas Rivando, les tribunaux se sont montrés réticents dans l'exercice de leur autorité. Dans quelques cas, des sentences ont été maintenues quand l'interprétation du contrat par l'arbitre a été jugée raisonnable. Par la suite, les cas ont été divisés en deux catégories : 1) les sentences arbitrales contenant des questions spécifiques de droit, par exemple l'interprétation de clause d'une convention, 2) celles concernant les questions matérielles de droit, par exemple lorsque l'arbitre décidait des questions de fait et de droit Selon les principes de droit commun exprimés dans un cas britannique, Absalom v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society, seules les sentences arbitrales de la deuxième catégorie ont été considérées par les tribunaux. Au début, l'application de la décision d'Absalom a limité l'exercice du pouvoir judiciaire, mais la distinction n'a pu être appliquée à l'arbitrage canadien, processus bien différent de l'arbitrage commercial britannique dont celui-ci tire pourtant son origine. Du reste, la revendication même des droits des tribunaux dans le cas Rivando mit en question la convenance de considérer certains cas hors du domaine juridique.
Les deux facteurs : le droit commercial britannique et l'arbitrage obligatoire, se sont trouvés réunis dans le cas Regina v. Barber, qui a mis fin à l'application de la décision d''Absalom. La Cour d'appel n'a pas fixé clairement les critères qu'elle désirait adopter pour juger les sentences d'arbitrage, mais elle semblait accorder un large pouvoir de se prononcer sur l'arbitrage uniquement dans les cas où les sentences ne répondent pas aux questions soumises aux arbitres ou celles où l'interprétation du contrat semble être trop libre. Le cas Barber apporta un autre changement dans l'arbitrage d'Ontario : la formation de tribunaux d'arbitrage. Auparavant, la majorité des arbitres neutres étaient des juges des tribunaux de comté, mais en 1967 le Parlement a restreint les activités extra-judiciaires de ces juristes. Ce phénomène devait encourager la professionnalisation de l'arbitrage mais également accentuer les conflits entre les arbitres et les tribunaux.
En raison de la tendance des tribunaux à intervenir dans l'arbitrage des griefs, un examen des récentes décisions pourrait indiquer les lignes de la pensée juridique. Il y a quatre domaines dans lesquels les arbitres et les tribunaux n'ont pu parvenir à définir leur juridiction respective.
Les questions concernant les preuves d'intention ont peut-être été les plus difficiles. Les tribunaux admettent de considérer les preuves extrinsèques telles que les usages et coutumes indigènes seulement lorsque les termes du contrat ne sont pas clairs. Le cas Barber a accentué la nécessité de s'appuyer sur les textes mêmes des conventions plutôt que sur les preuves extrinsèques. Il en est résulté une réticence des tribunaux à accepter les conclusions des arbitres lorsque celles-ci sont tirées des termes ambigus de la convention et ainsi ils ont cassé une série de sentences arbitrales reposant sur « des preuves extrinsèques ».
Des infractions dans les formalités requises pour les clauses de grief et d'arbitrage ont été une deuxième source de difficultés. Avec l'accord de la Cour suprême du Canada, les tribunaux d'Ontario ont restreint les pouvoirs des arbitres dans les limites de la stricte interprétation littérale de ces clauses même si l'intérêt du plaignant a été compromis sans qu'il y ait faute de sa part.
Des clauses de contrat prévoyant le congédiement seulement pour «cause justifiée » qui sont courantes dans les conventions collectives en Amérique du Nord, ont été fréquemment l'occasion de désaccords entre les tribunaux et les arbitres.
Les arbitres se trouvent souvent en accord avec l'employeur sur le fait que le travailleur a violé son contrat, mais ils ordonnent une réduction des sanctions prises surtout là où le renvoi d'un employé a été ordonné. Malgré le principe déclaré par la Cour suprême dans le cas de Polymer à savoir que les arbitres ont le pouvoir de régler ou d'ajuster les sanctions, ce tribunal a refusé aux arbitres d'Ontario le droit d'atténuer les sanctions disciplinaires si le contrat ne le prévoie pas spéci-fiquement.
Les tribunaux d'Ontario ont pris soin de protéger les droits des plaignants individuels en cas d'infractions au principe fondamental de justice naturelle. La Cour suprême du Canada a déclaré que tous les membres ayant un intérêt en cause, y compris ceux qui n'ont pas été signataires, devraient avoir la possibilité d'accéder à la procédure d'arbitrage.
Cet examen du développement du droit montre que l'élément d'obligation qu'on trouve dans l'OLRA a conduit les tribunaux à intervenir en matière d'arbitrage ; en plus, leur utilisation du droit britannique leur a donné la possibilité d'intervenir plus largement dans le processus d'arbitrage. Ceci met en lumière la difficulté d'appliquer au Canada une institution étrangère qui est aussi complexe et subtile que celle de l'arbitrage.
À cause des racines américaines du droit de l'Ontario, quelques arbitres auraient accordé une trop grande influence aux pratiques suivies aux États-Unis. Pour encourager le caractère professionnel de l'arbitrage au Canada, les signataires devraient préciser dans les conventions collectives les pouvoirs des arbitres.
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